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Market Reaction to Actual Daily Share Repurchases in Greece 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique, hand-collected data set of actual daily share repurchases from the Athens Stock 
Exchange, we examine the stock market reaction around the disclosure date of actual share 
repurchases, the factors that affect the size of that reaction, and the motives behind share 
acquisitions.  We find that different firms proceed to actual repurchases for different reasons: the 
results for the small firms and the firms with high book-to-market ratio repurchases are consistent 
with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis, while the results for the large firms and firms with 
low book-to-market ratio are in line with the price support hypothesis. In contrast to other studies, 
we find that long-term abnormal returns are higher for repurchasing firms compared to non-
repurchasing controls and depend positively on the frequency of repurchases.  
 
JEL Classification: G14, G15, G35 
Keywords: Actual share repurchases, market reaction, firm characteristics, stated repurchase 
reasons, price support hypothesis 
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1. Introduction  
Open-market share repurchases worldwide are characterized by two distinct stages: in the first 
stage, the firm authorizes a share repurchase program (SRP), and in the second stage, the firm can 
proceed to the implementation of the program. Depending on the disclosure regulations of the 
country, a public announcement may follow the SRP authorization and the actual repurchases 
made. The literature regarding the first stage has been voluminous and has examined issues such 
as the firm’s motives, the market reaction to SRP announcements, and the economic explanations 
of repurchases, among others.2 In contrast, the literature regarding the open-market SRP 
implementation stage is rather thin, largely depending on the availability of transaction data.  
Any explanation of the firm’s behavior in the first stage may not necessarily be applicable 
to the second stage. For instance, a firm may be motivated by undervaluation considerations when 
initiating an SRP. However, in the lengthy implementation period that follows, it may proceed to 
actual repurchases motivated by different goals (Cook et al., 2004), such as an arising opportunity 
to lower its acquisition cost, or a necessity to protect the long-term shareholders’ wealth in a 
declining market. The firm’s repurchasing pattern reveals much about the firm’s financial strength 
and intentions, and we expect the market to react to the disclosure of any relevant information.  
Regarding SRP implementations in the US market, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find 
that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, and that repurchases 
are positively related to the firm’s cash flow. Using voluntarily disclosed data for 64 firms’ 
repurchase programs, Cook et al. (2004) find no clear evidence about market timing. Starting in 
2004, US firms were required to disclose detailed information about their repurchase activity in 
their quarterly financial reports. Capitalizing on this requirement, Ben-Rephael et al. (2013) find 
                                                             
2 For a review see Vermaelen (2005) and the references therein. 
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that firms repurchase at discount prices compared to market prices, and that repurchases are 
followed by a positive and significant abnormal return later, at the time of company earnings 
announcements. Dittmar and Field (2015) find that repurchasing firms pay a lower than average 
price, and that the stock of infrequent repurchasers exhibits a higher long-run return.  
Regarding SRP implementations in foreign markets, Brockman and Chung (2001) and 
Zhang (2005) study the Hong Kong capital market, where firms are required to disclose repurchase 
details no later than the next trading day. Brockman and Chung (2001) find that managers acquire 
shares at a lower cost than a naive accumulation strategy, a result consistent with either timing 
based on insider information, or price support. In contrast, Zhang (2005), using a novel estimation 
technique by retaining in the sample only the first daily announcement in a sequence of multiple 
repurchase announcements within a month, finds evidence consistent with price support. In 
addition, the market reaction is positive for small and firms with high book-to-market ratio, which 
are more likely to be underpriced. Finally, Zhang (2005) finds no long-run effect of actual 
repurchases on stock returns.  
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) focus on the French market in the 2000-2002 period, with 
regulation rules requiring firms to disclose monthly detailed information about their repurchase 
activity. They find that repurchases have a negative effect on liquidity and generally reflect 
contrarian trading rather than market timing.  McNally et al. (2006) find that firms have superior 
timing ability, using monthly repurchase data from Canada.  
Akyol and Foo (2013) connect the two SRP stages, by matching the daily announced 
repurchase trades of the firms to the company-stated motives for undertaking the respective 
repurchase program. The undervaluation motive is shown to be a strong signal, because the firms 
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stating an undervaluation motive exhibit more positive abnormal returns upon the announcement 
of their actual trades, and fare better than their controls one year after the repurchases.   
In the aforementioned literature, there is a general consensus about the beneficial effect of 
the firm’s actual repurchase activity, but there are differences regarding stock returns in the short- 
and the long-run, and differences regarding the explanations of the firm’s behavior. The 
differences might be attributed to firm characteristics, to the methodology used, or to the 
institutional factors characterizing each market. One such institutional factor might be the 
disclosure requirement. In the Greek stock market, which is the focus of our paper, and for the 
period we are studying, firms disclose their repurchases within seven trading days. Compared to 
the institutional setting of other published studies on actual share repurchases, the Greek disclosure 
requirement is different from the daily requirement of Hong-Kong (Brockman and Chung, 2001) 
or Australia (Akyol and Foo, 2006), and the monthly requirement of France in the 2000-2002 
period (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). Because the institutional setting is different from other 
countries, an empirical study of the Greek market would allow us to understand further these 
controversies. 
The present study uses a unique database of hand-collected data from the Athens Stock 
Exchange regarding open-market repurchases and covering the period from August 2005 to 
December 2010. During this period, immediately after the European Union directive on insider 
trading and market abuse (2003/6/EU) was incorporated in the Greek law, the companies were 
required to disclose their daily transactions on share repurchases no later than seven trading days. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to gauge the firms’ daily repurchasing behavior 
in Europe after the passage of the new directive.3  
                                                             
3 For European SRPs, see Lee et al. (2010) and Andriosopoulos and Lasfer (2015).  
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Furthermore, we employ a rich data set of 7,619 announcements of actual share 
repurchases, which enables us to draw reliable conclusions regarding the repurchase activity of 
firms and the reaction of investors.  Hence, our study contributes much needed evidence to the 
non-US literature on actual daily share repurchases.  
Overall, we find that companies engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a 
declining trend, and that the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant, a result that 
is consistent with the price support hypothesis (Cook et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005, Ginglinger and 
Hamon, 2007; Akyol and Foo, 2013).  
However, when we focus on firm characteristics, we find that smaller firms and firms with 
a higher book-to-market ratio repurchase shares without having observed significant fluctuations 
in the period preceding the buybacks. For this group of firms, the short-term investor reaction is 
positive and statistically significant, consistent with the hypothesis that the firm is signaling 
undervaluation. In contrast, larger firms and firms with a lower book-to-market ratio repurchase 
shares after periods in which the stock price has been in a declining course, and, after the share 
acquisitions, a price stabilization takes place, in line with the price support hypothesis. This result 
agrees with Zhang (2005).  
Regarding repurchase characteristics, when there is a short interval between 
announcements or when the percentage of shares bought back is low, the results confirm the price 
support hypothesis, and when the percentage of share bought back is high, the findings are in line 
with the the hypothesis that the firm is signaling undervaluation.  
The stated reason for authorizing an SRP is related to share price movements before and 
after the actual repurchase as follows: firms which state that their stock is undervalued as a reason 
for approving an SRP, receive a positive reaction by the market when they proceed with the 
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implementation of the SRP. Firms that avoid mentioning a specific reason for approving SRPs 
exhibit a pattern of pre- and post-repurchase returns that is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
firm is using stock buybacks as a means of stopping the declining trend of their share price.  
In contrast to the literature of actual share buybacks, such as Zhang (2005) and Akyol and 
Foo (2013), we find a strong long-term abnormal return for firms that conduct repurchases. This 
is consistent with the notion that managers have successfully used repurchases to add value for 
their long-term shareholders. This phenomenon may have been accentuated by the market’s 
underreaction to the actual share repurchase announcement, which leads to a positive long-term 
drift in stock returns (Ikenberry et al., 1995). In addition, we find that the long-run return of these 
firms is positively related to the frequency of actual repurchases and negatively related to book-
to-market ratios.  
This paper examines three possible motivations of firms when conducting actual 
repurchases, namely, market timing, supporting the stock price, and signaling undervaluation, the 
first two being most common in the aforementioned literature on actual repurchases and the third 
one being the most common explanation in repurchases in general. Of course, we realize there may 
be other motivations for repurchasing firms, which, however, are outside the scope of the present 
study.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework and the hypotheses 
to be tested are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the disclosure requirement and 
the data. The empirical results are shown in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Hypothesis development  
2.1. Short-term share price performance 
When a firm approves an open-market SRP, it is not obligated to complete it. Moreover, if the firm 
decides to implement the program, management has a wide spectrum of short-term, value-adding 
actions to benefit the shareholders or itself (through performance-related pay or stock ownership). 
These actions can have motivations which can only be uncovered by the firm’s actual repurchase 
behavior and can be quite different from the motivations at the SRP initiation stage. Managers can 
time the market, provide liquidity to curb a downward trend of the firm’s stock price, or even give 
a signal to the investors that the stock is undervalued. We examine if the actual repurchase pattern 
is consistent with any of these three motivations.  
Market timing, or managerial timing ability, is a term that refers to the acquisition of own 
shares when the stock price is at low levels. The purpose is to exploit the current stock price 
fluctuations for the benefit of the long-term investors, provided that the market is not characterized 
by strong form efficiency (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
 A fundamental question related to stock buybacks is to what extend the executives use their 
private information to proceed with stock repurchases (Barclay and Smith, 1988). Brockman and 
Chung (2001) use daily data from the Hong Kong stock market and find that executives possess a 
market timing ability which depends on the market conditions and the special characteristics of 
the firm. In the same vein, using monthly data from Japan, Ishikawa and Takahashi (2011) find 
that firms acquire their own shares if their stock price has followed a declining trend during the 
previous month, and that the stock returns of firms actually repurchasing shares exceeds the market 
return during the ensuing months.  
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 The market timing hypothesis implies that the market price of the stock will be lower 
during the dates of conducting share repurchases in comparison to the subsequent days. The study 
by De Cesari et al. (2012) for the USA finds that indeed the companies seem to possess the ability 
to time the market and succeed in acquiring their own shares at a relatively low price. In addition, 
they find that during the month before the share acquisitions, the stock price follows a declining 
trend and a negative abnormal return is observed, whereas after the repurchase, a positive abnormal 
return is observed. Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2015) also find results 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis.  
H1: Negative abnormal returns are observed before the actual share repurchases in the open 
market and positive abnormal returns are observed after the share repurchases.  
According to the price support hypothesis, share repurchases are conducted by a company 
to stem a declining trend in the stock price. The main difference with the market timing hypothesis 
is that, a stabilization of stock prices is expected after the share repurchase, whereas in the case of 
the market timing hypothesis, a positive abnormal return is expected.   
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) study the French market and find that companies proceed to 
stock buybacks following periods of declining stock prices, but they do not observe a significant 
price increase after the repurchase. The results are consistent with the price support hypothesis. 
Similar results are found by Cook et al. (2004) for the shares that are traded at the New York Stock 
Exchange.  
H2: Negative abnormal returns are observed in the period before a share repurchase occurs 
and no abnormal returns are observed during the period after the repurchase.  
 The signaling undervaluation hypothesis has been popular in the SRP initiation literature 
and suggests that managers are using share repurchases to signal “their disagreement with how the 
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market is pricing existing public information” (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Regarding its 
manifestation in the actual repurchase stage, it differs from the market timing hypothesis in that, 
for the period before the repurchase, the stock price is not necessarily on a declining path, i.e., the 
firm does not trade against the market (Zhang, 2005).  
In the studies of Zhang (2005) and Akyol and Foo (2013), even though the undervaluation 
hypothesis is not explicitly addressed, the results are in accordance with this hypothesis. Zhang 
(2005) finds that the market reaction is positive for small and firms with high book-to-market ratio, 
which are more likely to be underpriced. Akyol and Foo (2013) report that for firms that state 
undervaluation as the motive for initiating a share repurchase program, the price reaction is 
positive when those firms proceed to the actual buybacks. The abnormal return for the ten-day 
period before the repurchase is not statistically significant for the undervaluation motive firms.  
H3: Firms conduct repurchases regardless of the preceding share price trend, and the 
market reacts positively to the actual share repurchase announcements. 
 
2.2. Company characteristics and repurchase behavior 
Several studies find that companies with different characteristics exhibit different behavior 
regarding share repurchase activities and the market reaction is also different.  Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) examine announcements of SRPs (irrespective of whether the shares were eventually 
bought back) and find that, in the short-run, the market reaction is more favorable to SRP 
announcements by companies of smaller size. Examining tender offer share repurchase 
announcements in the US, Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find significantly higher post-repurchase 
returns for low-Tobin’s-q firms compared to high-Tobin’s-q firms. Cook et al. (2004) use 
voluntarily disclosed daily data, to find that the larger companies proceed to buybacks after periods 
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in which the stock price exhibits a downward trend, whereas for the smaller companies no such 
result is observed. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) argue that frequent buybacks are driven by 
different motives than infrequent buybacks. The specific characteristics we focus on are size and 
B/M.  
H4: The firm size and the Β/Μ ratio are related to the share price pattern around the actual 
share repurchase announcements.  
 
2.3. Stated reasons for approving stock repurchase programs 
At the SRP initiation stage, and depending on repurchase regulations, firms can state the reason 
for approving a repurchase program, and an interesting question is whether the firm’s statements 
have any informational content for the investors. Otchere and Ross (2002) examine a sample of 
announcements of SRPs for which the stated reason for their approval is share undervaluation. 
These announcements are treated as a positive signal by the investors, and the market reacts 
favorably for the companies that approve SRPs. Such reaction is smaller, although positive for 
rival companies in the same industry, a fact that is consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that at the announcement of SRP approval, the market reaction 
is stronger for firms that state undervaluation as the motive for the approval.  
An even more interesting question is whether the firm’s statements have any value for 
investors during the program implementation. Using daily data from Australia, Akyol and Foo 
(2013) conclude that for companies which announce as a reason for initiating an SRP the fact that 
the stock is underpriced, the investors reaction is positive and stronger compared to the companies 
that announce a different reason for SRP approval. This observation holds both for the 
announcement date of the SRPs and for the dates of the actual repurchases. In addition, companies 
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which mention their stock underpricing as a reason for approving repurchases eventually buy back 
fewer shares in relation to companies which state a different reason for SRP approval, while daily 
repurchases do not seem to occur as a response to the stock price trend.  
H5: The stated reason for approving an SRP affects the market reaction around the actual 
share repurchase announcements.  
 
3. Disclosure requirements and share repurchase data 
In Greece, an open-market SRP must be authorized by the shareholders’ General Meeting, which 
defines the maximum number of shares that can be purchased, the duration of the SRP and the 
maximum and minimum price that can be paid. Α firm may repurchase up to 10% of its outstanding 
shares, and certain conditions for trading are imposed: At the date of the actual buyback, the 
repurchase price cannot be higher than the price of the last trade or the highest current bid. The 
company cannot repurchase more than 25% of the average daily volume of the shares. The average 
daily volume figure is based either on the daily volume traded in the month preceding the month 
of public disclosure of that program, or the daily volume traded in the 20 trading days preceding 
the date of purchase. In cases of extremely low liquidity, a firm may repurchase up to 50% of the 
average daily volume, provided that both the stock market authority and the investors are informed 
in advance, as per European Regulation No. 2273/2003.  
 The shares bought back can be resold at the discretion of the board of directors, but not 
concurrently with an ongoing SRP. Any remaining shares must be distributed to the employees or 
cancelled within three years with a decision of the general meeting. Beginning in 2007, the 
maximum duration of the programs changed from twelve to twenty-four months. The key 
information about the repurchase programs that is available to the investors in the program 
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announcement includes: The date of the general meeting, the maximum number of shares to be 
repurchased, the duration of the program, and the reason for initiating a repurchase program 
(Drousia et al., 2018). 
Until June 2005, companies disclosed their share repurchase activity in irregular intervals 
of a few months up to one year. Starting in July 2005, when the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EU 
was implemented with the Greek Law 3340/2005, repurchasing companies have been treated as 
insiders with privileged information, and their daily share repurchase activity should be posted on 
the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange by the end of the seventh trading session 
from the actual share repurchase. The key available information about the companies’ daily 
repurchase activity includes: The date of the actual repurchase, the date of the announcement of 
the repurchase, the number of repurchased shares, and the average share price paid.  
Capitalizing on this transparency of the Greek stock market, we construct a unique, hand-
collected dataset including public announcements of companies whose stocks trade on the Athens 
Stock Exchange. The data concerning the repurchase programs and the daily open-market share 
repurchase activity are hand-collected from the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange. 
The rest of the data such as stock price, firm size (market value of equity) and book-to-market ratio 
are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream and Thomson Reuters WorldScope. 
Table 1 reports the share repurchase activity in Greece from August 2005 to December 
2010. We obtain 7,619 announcements of actual share repurchases, made by 74 firms under 120 
program authorizations. The total repurchase dates are 9,664, because an announcement may 
contain information about more than one repurchase-day. A factor that differentiates the present 
paper from other studies about actual share repurchases is that the number of the announcements 
and the number of repurchase days do not coincide (Panel A).  
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To include an announcement in the study, we require that the number of shares that are 
bought and the average price are reported daily. Several announcements are excluded because: i) 
the company had preferred shares as well as common shares at the date of the SRP authorization; 
ii) they contained buybacks for two to seven days but did not report the number of shares or the 
average price for every day separately, and iii) they were made later (not immediately) and is 
considered very likely that investors had already been informed by another source, such as the 
Internet or a newspaper. Other reasons for excluding announcements are repetition of the purchase 
date and incomplete information. To eliminate extreme observations, announcements that 
contained buybacks for more than seven trading days or are made after a reverse split (which 
changed significantly the number and the price of the company’s traded shares) are not included 
in the study. Panel B of Table 1 reports in detail the number of announcements that are excluded. 
The final dataset includes 7,463 announcements of actual share repurchases, made by 69 firms 
under 109 program authorizations (Panel C). 
The aim of this study is to examine the price performance surrounding the announcements 
of actual share repurchases as well as long-term. It is obvious that the number of announcements 
is quite large for the study period. In Panel D, we observe that most firms (53%) made more than 
fifty announcements. The percentage of firms that announced more than a hundred daily 
transactions is 33%. Throughout the period under consideration two firms made only one 
announcement, while one firm made 558 announcements. To avoid undue weighting of firms and 
clustering problems we follow the approach of Zhang (2005), that is, when a firm makes multiple 
repurchase announcements within a month, only the first announcement is included in the final 
sample. Using this approach, we end up with 826 announcements of actual share repurchases, 
which represent the event days of the study. 
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(Insert Table 1 here) 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the 826 announcements of the final 
sample. Quartile rankings are determined relative to all firms that are listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange on the day of the actual share buyback announcement. Small firms and firms with higher 
book-to-market ratio (B/M) have made less repurchase announcements, while larger firms report 
more repurchase days during the study period. In 2008, the number of repurchase announcements 
almost tripled from the previous year, as the stock exchange index dropped to lower levels 
following the onset of the global financial crisis. Panel B of Table 2 reports the number of trading 
days per announcement. The announcements that report more than one repurchase-day are about 
23.5% of the dataset. In other words, the disclosure requirement in the present study is different 
from the next-day requirement of Hong-Kong (Brockman and Chung, 2001) or Australia (Akyol 
and Foo, 2006), and the monthly requirement of France in the 2000-2002 period (Ginglinger and 
Hamon, 2007). 
We proceed with the estimation of the short-term market reaction surrounding the actual 
share repurchase announcements. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Short-term market reaction  
We use the standard event study methodology to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
around the announcements of actual daily share repurchases. The market model is used as the 
benchmark model, with an estimation period ranging from 200 to 21 days before the announcement 
(−200, −21) and an event window that starts 120 trading days before the date of the announcement 
16 
 
and ends 20 days after the announcement (−120, +20). The market returns are based on the General 
Index of the Athens Stock Exchange. The event day (day “0”) is the day of the actual share 
repurchase announcement at the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange. To determine 
statistical significance of the mean CARs, we use the Patell Z-test.  
Table 3 reports the average cumulative abnormal return around the announcements of 
actual share repurchases. The windows (−120, −1), (−60, −1), (−20, −1) and (−10, −1) are used to 
examine whether firms tend to repurchase when the stock price underperforms the market. 
Repurchasing when the stock price follows a downward trend is consistent with both the market 
timing and the price support hypothesis. The window (0, +1) aims to capture the effect of the initial 
announcement. The windows (+2, +10) and (+2, +20) are used to examine the short-term market 
reaction after the announcement day, approximately one calendar month.  
The results for the full sample (Panel A of Table 3) suggest that companies buy shares after 
intervals where the stock price shows a downward trend. The immediate response is not 
statistically significant. In the period immediately after the announcement, i.e., event window (+2, 
+10), investors show a slightly positive reaction that gradually disappears. Between (+2, +20), the 
reaction is not statistically different from zero. The results are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis (H2) rather than the market timing hypothesis (H1), and agree with Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2007).  
The next section examines whether and how some company and repurchase characteristic 
affect the company repurchase decision and the market reaction. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
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4.2.  Share price performance related to company and repurchase characteristics 
Various studies suggest that company characteristics affect the company repurchase activity as 
well as the investors’ reaction. Dittmar (2000) argues that different firms proceed to buybacks for 
different reasons. Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) find that companies with higher book-to-market 
ratio report higher long-term abnormal return after the announcement of SRP authorizations. 
Furthermore, the market reacts more favorably to buyback announcements of smaller companies. 
Cook et al. (2004) observe that larger firms repurchase after periods when the price of the stock 
underperforms the market.  
 We proceed with the examination of the company characteristics. In Panel B of Table 3 the 
announcements are grouped according to firm size and B/M ratio. The firm size is estimated as the 
market value of equity. Quartile rankings are computed using all listed firms on the Athens Stock 
Exchange on the day of the actual share repurchase announcement. 
Overall, the results suggest that smaller firms and firms with higher B/M ratio (whose 
shares are likely to be undervalued) repurchase shares even though the share price has not 
experienced any abnormal change in the period preceding the announcement. Investors short-term 
reaction is positive and statistically significant. Larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio 
repurchase shares after intervals when the shock price follows a declining path. Following the 
share buyback, we observe a stabilization of prices. Thus, the results for smaller firms and firms 
with higher B/M ratio are in accordance with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis (H3). The 
results for the larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis (H2). Furthermore, these results are confirmed by the significance for the difference 
between mean CARs in the subsamples. This is corroborated by Figures 1 and 2, which shows the 
cumulative average abnormal return for the 41-day period surrounding the announcement date 
18 
 
(−20, +20) according to size quartile and B/M ratio quartile, respectively. Overall, we conclude 
that hypothesis H4 holds. The findings are similar to those of Zhang (2005).  
In Panel C of Table 3 the data are grouped according to repurchase characteristics. 
Following the methodology of Zhang (2005) we used three variables: a) the number of days that 
elapse between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the 
immediately preceding announcement of the company within a year period, b) the number of 
company announcements in the quarter preceding the current announcement, and c) the percentage 
of shares acquired over the number of outstanding shares. The first two variables estimate the 
degree of "surprise" of the actual share repurchase announcement, that is, whether it was expected 
or unexpected by investors. The announcements are divided into two categories with cut-off point 
the median of each distribution, i.e., 3 days and 13 announcements, respectively. The third variable 
is an estimate of the signal’s strength. In this case the announcements are divided into two equal 
subsets. 
When the actual share repurchase announcements are frequent (either the interval between 
the announcements is less than 3 days or the number of announcements is greater than 13 during 
the preceding three months), the initial reaction is not statistically significant, which is somehow 
expected. For the cases where the number of days since the previous announcement and the 
repurchase size are small, we observe a negative and statistically significant abnormal return in the 
twenty trading days preceding the event day. The CAR(+2, +20) is not statistically significant. The 
results are in accordance with the price support hypothesis. For the cases where the number of 
announcements is small in the quarter before the event day, the findings are consistent with the 
market timing hypothesis. For the cases where the repurchase size is high, the results support the 
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signaling undervaluation hypothesis. However, the results are not confirmed by the test for the 
difference between mean CARs in the subsamples. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
4.3. Share price performance related to the reason for program authorization 
In Greece companies are required to announce the reason for initiating an SRP at the date of the 
program authorization. The most common reason for authorization, as stated by the companies, is 
stock undervaluation. For a large percentage of programs, the reason is not explicitly stated (the 
company just states that the acquisitions will be conducted in accordance to the existing laws). 
Few programs fall into a third category, with various causes of approval, for example, the 
cancellation of shares to reduce its share capital, sell-back to the market, distribution to employees 
or a combination of these reasons.  
Using the categorization mentioned above, we examine the market reaction to 
announcements of actual share repurchases. The evidence in Table 4 indicates that the short-term 
market reaction is greater when the firm-stated reason for authorizing a SRP is to support the stock 
price in case of undervaluation. When the reason is not explicitly stated, the CAR for the preceding 
period is negative and statistically significant, while the short-term CAR(+2, +20) is not 
statistically significant. The results are consistent with the price support hypothesis. When the 
reason is very specific but other than stock undervaluation, it appears that the information is 
already incorporated in the share price and there is no statistically significant reaction. Therefore, 
there is evidence that hypothesis H5 holds.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
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4.4. Factors affecting the market reaction 
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used, to examine whether and to what extent some 
characteristics of companies and announcements affect the market reaction to actual share 
repurchase announcements. Following Zhang (2005), we regress the initial market reaction, 
CAR(0, +1), the immediate short-term reaction, CAR(+2, +10), and a month after the 
announcement, CAR(+2, +20), on firm and repurchase characteristics. 
 Table 5 reports summary statistics for the variables we use in our regression analysis. “Firm 
size” is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity and “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio, 
both measured on the day of the actual share repurchase announcement. “CAR(−20, −1)” denotes 
the abnormal return for the month before the announcement. “NDLR” is the number of days since 
the last repurchase announcement of the company and estimates the time between the actual share 
repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is 
the number of the company’s announcements during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the 
announcements made within the last 90 days before the event day under examination. The 
variables “NDLR” and “NAP3M” are determined based on Zhang's (2005) methodology. “NTDA” 
is the number of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports 
the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. “Repurchase 
size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. We also include 
dummy variables for the three different groups of stated reasons for SRP authorization: stock 
undervaluation, not specific reason, and stated reason other than stock undervaluation. Because 
the coefficients of the dummy variables are not statistically significant in any case, they are not 
further reported. In addition, to reduce the influence of extreme values, the variables are formed 
by winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
21 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 Table 6 shows the results of three main regression models with the method of ordinary 
least squares (OLS). We control for year fixed effects in all models, and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. We observe that the coefficient of the B/M ratio is positive, a finding 
that supports the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. Also, the investors reaction is negatively 
related to the number of announcements in the previous quarter, a result that is different from 
Zhang (2005). Interestingly, the coefficient of the abnormal performance in the period before the 
announcement is positive and statistically significant only in the period (+2, +10). 
 (Insert Table 6 here) 
 
4.5. Long-term price performance 
To examine whether managers successfully exploit stock undervaluation, Ikenberry et al. (1995, 
2000) find that, after announcing SRP authorizations, firms exhibit strong abnormal long-term 
returns, and that this result is more pronounced in firms with higher book-to-market ratio. 
Regarding actual daily share repurchases, Akyol and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005) do not find 
significant long-term abnormal returns for repurchasing firms compared to a matching sample of 
non-repurchasing firms. However, Zhang (2005) finds that firms with high book-to-market ratio 
perform better in the long-term.  
In our analysis so far, we assume that the market is efficient in incorporating the publicly 
available information in the actual share repurchase announcements. If this is not the case, it is 
likely that the market will correct its short-term misreaction in a longer horizon. We examine long-
term returns to see if investors revise their expectations upward following actual share repurchases. 
We follow the methodology of Barber and Lyon (1997) and compare one-, two- and three-year 
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buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) against a control sample, using monthly data.4 The firms in the 
control sample are selected by first requiring the matching firm to have a market value between 
70% and 130% of the repurchasing firm in the same calendar year, and then selecting the firm with 
the closest B/M ratio to that of the repurchasing firm.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the repurchasing firms outperform the control firms for 
all periods. The negative return signs are a result of the falling equity market especially after 2007. 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are 11.57%, 18.1% and 29.18% for the one-, two-, 
and three-year holding periods and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with the notion that managers have successfully used repurchases to support the stock 
price to add value for their shareholders. The high long-run returns phenomenon may have been 
accentuated by the market’s underreaction to the actual share repurchase announcement, which 
leads to a positive long-term drift in stock returns (Ikenberry et al., 1995). In any case, the result 
is different from Akyol and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005), who do not find significant long-term 
abnormal returns for repurchasing firms.  
Further examination of the BHARs by size quantile in Panel B of Table 7, the repurchasing 
firms exhibit statistically significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns, especially the smaller ones. 
Furthermore, considering the B/M characteristics of the firms, we observe that the BHARs for 
repurchasing firms are positive and most of them are significant at the 1% level. The firms with 
the highest B/M ratios (quartile 1 and 2), seem to perform better than control firms, especially in 
three-year holding horizons, and this result agrees with Zhang (2015).  
Regarding the relationship between announcement reasons and long-term returns, all the 
stated reasons for conducting a repurchase are positively related to BHARs, as shown in Table 8.  
                                                             
4 Thus, our total data coverage extends to 2013, three years beyond the announcements period. 
23 
 
However, when the company’s reason for conducting a repurchase is specified in the 
announcement and it is different from stock undervaluation, the repurchasing firms seem to exhibit 
the strongest long-term abnormal performance.  
The three-year BHARs are regressed against several variables, as shown in Table 9. We 
conclude that the B/M variable is negatively related to BHARs, as expected. In addition, the 
number of repurchases made during the preceding three-month period (NAP3M) is positive and 
statistically significant. In other words, frequent repurchasers seem to be characterized by high 
long-term price performance.  
Insert Table 7 here. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
Insert Table 9 here. 
 
4.6. Robustness tests 
We perform various sensitivity tests: (1) using alternative estimation periods (−250, −31) and 
(−300, −41); (2) using alternative short-run announcement period return windows such as (−1, +1) 
and (−2, +2); (3) winsorizing the returns at the 1st and 99th or 5th and 95th percentiles to control for 
outliers; (4) using other parametric and non-parametric test methods such as the standardized 
cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991), which accounts for event-induced variance, and the 
rank test of Corrado (1989); and (5) using other benchmark models such as the market-adjusted 
return model, the mean-adjusted return model, and the market model with the Scholes-Williams 
beta estimation method. None of these variations changes our results. 
Akyol and Foo (2013) follow the methodology of Zhang (2005) with a slight variation: For 
the calculation of the variables that assess the degree of "surprise", they impose a further restriction 
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that the announcements are made under the same program. We use the same modification to re-
estimate the abnormal returns. The results are similar. 
During the period under examination, some firms made only one share repurchase 
announcement. Other firms repurchased almost daily while their SRP was in effect. To examine if 
the Mean CAR has been affected by the companies with the largest number of announcements, we 
conduct the following test. We calculate the average cumulative abnormal return for each company 
separately and then carry out significance tests across firms. The results do not change.  
To ensure that our regression results are robust to the clustering problem, we use alternative 
techniques for estimating standard errors and found similar results. We calculate standard errors 
adapted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West (1987). Finally, 
we group the residuals in two dimensions, by company and by day, following the two-way 
technique proposed by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011). The coefficients of the variables 
about the stated reasons for SRP authorizations are not statistically significant in any model.5 
 
5. Conclusions 
Compared to the literature regarding the initiation stage of open-market repurchase programs, the 
literature regarding actual repurchases is very thin and focuses on non-US markets characterized 
by a timely disclosure of buyback transactions. Using an extensive dataset of announcements 
regarding conducted repurchases in the Greek stock market, we examine when companies choose 
to implement their approved SRPs and the investors’ reaction. In addition, we investigate how 
some company characteristics (firm size and book-to-market ratio) and repurchase characteristics 
(frequency and size of repurchases), as well as the preceding mandatory company announcement 
                                                             
5 All robustness tests are available from the authors upon request. 
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stating the reason for approving an SRP, affect the behavior of companies and investors in the 
short- and the long-term.  
Overall, we find that companies engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a 
declining trend, and that the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant, a result that 
is consistent with the price support hypothesis. However, the price pattern around repurchases of 
smaller firms and firms with a higher book-to-market ratio is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the firm is signaling undervaluation. In contrast, larger firms and firms with a lower book-to-
market ratio repurchase shares to stabilize their stock price. Regarding repurchase characteristics, 
when there is a short interval between announcements or when the percentage of shares bought 
back is low, the results confirm the price support hypothesis, and when the percentage of share 
bought back is high, the findings are in line with the the hypothesis that the firm is signaling 
undervaluation. 
The company’s stated reason for approving an SRP affects the market reaction at the time 
of actual share repurchases. In contrast to the literature, we find that long-term abnormal returns 
are higher for repurchasing firms compared to non-repurchasing controls and depend positively on 
the frequency of repurchases.  
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Figure 1 
Mean CAR of firms according to size quartile (Q1: Small, Q4: Large) in the window 
(−20, +20).  Day “0” on the horizontal axis is the date of the announcement of the 
actual share repurchases. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mean CAR of firms according to B/M ratio quartile (Q1: High, Q4: Low) in the 
window (−20, +20).  Day “0” on the horizontal axis is the date of the announcement 
of the actual share repurchases. 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics of daily share repurchases in Greece from August 2005 to 
December 2010 
Panel A:  Full dataset  
Number of firms 74 
Number of program authorizations 120 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,619 
Number of repurchase days 9,664 
Total number of shares repurchased 276,627,699 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 1,946,269,573 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 103 
Panel Β:  Reason for excluding announcements  
Preference shares 87 
The number of shares or the average price is not known for 
every day separately 42 
Late announcements 1 
Repetition of repurchase date 9 
Missing information 2 
The announcement reported more than seven trading days 10 
Reverse split 5 
Panel C:  Dataset after excluding the announcements in Panel B 
Number of firms 69 
Number of program authorizations 109 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,463 
Number of repurchase days 9,065 
Total number of shares repurchased 269,574,548 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 1,827,838,405 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 108 
Panel D:  Number of repurchase announcements per firm 
Number of firms with less than 10 repurchase announcements 11 (16%) 
Number of firms with 11-20 repurchase announcements 9 (13%) 
Number of firms with 21-50 repurchase announcements 12 (18%) 
Number of firms with 51-100 repurchase announcements 14 (20%) 
Number of firms with more than 100 repurchase announcements 23 (33%) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of open market share repurchases from August 2005 to December 2010 
Panel A: Size and B/M quartiles 
Year Repurchase Size quartile  Book-to-market quartile 
 announcement 1(small) 2 3 4(large)  1(high) 2 3 4(low) 
2005 10 0 7 3 0  0 7 3 0 
2006 49 0 21 14 14  5 22 13 9 
2007 86 2 16 33 35  33 12 17 24 
2008 240 19 70 35 116  50 43 77 70 
2009 230 39 46 57 88  39 110 30 51 
2010 211 16 48 61 86  32 63 65 51 
All 826 76 208 203 339  159 257 205 205 
Panel B: Distribution of repurchase days per announcement 
Repurchase days 
per announcement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of 
announcements  
631  59  37  26  49  21  3  
Percent  76.5 7.1 4.5 3.1 5.9 2.5 0.4 
To avoid undue weighting of firms and clustering problems we follow the approach of Zhang (2005), i.e., when a 
firm makes multiple repurchase announcements within a month, only the first announcement is included in the final 
sample.  
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Table 3  
Abnormal share price performance surrounding announcements of actual share repurchases 
   Window       
  N (−120,−1)  (−60,−1)  (−20,−1)  (−10,−1)  (0,+1)  (+2,+10)  (+2,+20) 
Panel A: Full sample  
CAR  826 −1.49% −1.10%* −0.95%*** −0.74%*** −0.14% 0.58%** 0.46% 
   (−1.63 ) (−1.72) (−2.88) (−2.83) (−0.98) (2.05) (0.84) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics 
1. By size quartile 
CAR 1 (small) 76 −0.03% 2.28% 2.22% 0.16% −0.17% 2.19%* 3.67%** 
 
  (−0.32) (0.64) (1.21) (0.12) (0.06) (1.77) (2.50) 
CAR 2 208 −1.31% −1.18% −0.62% −0.22% −0.47%* −0.05% 0.01% 
 
  (−0.48) (−0.30) (−0.59) (−0.12) (−1.89) (−0.15) (0.15) 
CAR 3 203 −0.65% −0.13% −0.98% −0.45% 0.08% 0.77%* 1.10% 
 
  (−0.43) (−0.23) (−1.33) (−0.71) (0.29) (1.67) (1.17) 
CAR 4 (large) 339 −2.44%* −2.38%*** −1.85%*** −1.44%*** −0.06% 0.50% −0.36% 
   (−1.68) (−2.58) (−3.58) (−3.83) (−0.29) (1.12) (−0.90) 
Difference (Q1−Q4) Mean 2.41% 4.66%** 4.07%** 1.60% −0.11% 1.69%* 4.03%*** 
   [0.88] [2.09] [2.45] [1.29] [−0.19] [1.71]  [2.77] 
2. By B/M quartile 
CAR 1 (high) 159 4.07% 2.54% 1.53% 0.70% 0.56%* 2.15%*** 2.56%** 
    (0.86) (0.99) (0.79) (0.77) (1.88) (2.67) (2.21) 
CAR 2 257 −1.91% −0.18% −0.28% −0.26% −0.22% 0.48%* 0.95%* 
    (−0.85) (0.10) (0.04) (−0.42) (−0.64) (1.70) (1.75) 
CAR 3 205 −3.08% −4.46%*** −2.82%*** −1.44%*** −0.22% −0.39% −1.18%* 
 
  (−1.37) (−2.93) (−3.64) (−2.66) (−0.56) (−0.87) (−1.78) 
CAR 4 (low) 205 −3.71%* −1.71% −1.84%*** −1.77%*** −0.50%** 0.47% −0.13% 
   (−1.72) (−1.50) (−2.88) (−3.24) (−2.34) (0.72) (−0.45) 
Difference (Q1−Q4) Mean 7.78%*** 4.25%** 3.37%** 2.47%** 1.06%*** 1.68%* 2.69%** 
   [3.89] [2.24] [2.57] [2.43] [2.76] [1.95] [2.09] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel C: Announcements grouped by repurchase characteristics 
1. By number of days since last repurchase announcement 
CAR ≤ 3 422 −1.61% −0.85% −1.34%*** −1.10%*** −0.11% 0.97%** 0.70% 
 
  (−1.43) (−1.33) (−2.97) (−3.21) (−0.46) (2.00) (0.52) 
CAR > 3 404 −1.38% −1.35% −0.55% −0.37% −0.17% 0.17% 0.22% 
 
  (−0.88) (−1.10) (−1.09) (−0.77) (−0.93) (0.89) (0.66) 
Difference (≤ 3) – (> 3) Mean −0.23% 0.50% −0.79% −0.73% 0.06% 0.80% 0.48% 
   [−0.17] [0.42] [−0.97] [−1.19] [0.23] [1.51] [0.61] 
2. By number of announcements during the preceding 3 months 
CAR ≤ 13 416 −2.51% −1.94%* −1.79%*** −1.08%*** −0.15% 1.31%*** 1.38%** 
 
  (−1.63) (−1.73) (−3.36) (−2.60) (−0.98) (3.70) (2.44) 
CAR > 13 410 −0.46% −0.24% −0.10% −0.40% −0.13% −0.16% −0.47% 
 
  (−0.68) (−0.71) (−0.71) (−1.40) (−0.40) (−0.82) (−1.27) 
Difference (≤ 13) − (> 13) Mean −2.05% −1.70% −1.69%** −0.68% −0.02% 1.47%*** 1.85%** 
  [−1.57] [−1.43] [−2.06] [−1.10] [−0.10] [2.78] [2.37] 
3. By repurchase size (%) 
CAR low 413 −1.38% −1.24%* −1.18%*** −0.80%** −0.24% 0.26% −0.03% 
 
  (−1.23) (−1.67) (−2.69) (−2.46) (−1.18) (0.60) (−0.65) 
CAR high 413 −1.61% −0.95% −0.73% −0.68% −0.03% 0.90%** 0.95%* 
   (−1.08) (−0.76) (−1.38) (−1.54) (−0.20) (2.30) (1.83) 
Difference (low − high) Mean 0.23% −0.29% −0.45% −0.12% −0.21% −0.64% −0.98% 
   [0.17] [−0.24] [−0.55] [−0.19] [−0.82] [−1.20] [−1.25] 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase announcement. 
The Patell Z-test for the significance of mean CARs is shown in parentheses. Significance for the difference between mean CARs is based on the 
t-test assuming unequal variances (in brackets). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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 Τable 4 
 Mean CAR grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as stated by the company.  
  Window 
 
(−120,−1) (−60,−1) (−20,−1) (−10,−1) (0,+1) (+2,+10) (+2,+20) 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
CAR −0.65% 0.82% −0.68% 0.27% 0.08% 1.11%* 1.77%** 
  (−0.11) (0.88) (−0.02) (1.17) (0.29) (1.76) (2.10) 
2. Non-stated reason 
CAR −2.01%* −2.03%*** −1.37%*** −1.20%*** −0.19% 0.65%* 0.52% 
  (−1.85) (−2.66) (−3.52) (−4.05) (−0.98) (1.71) (0.63) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation 
CAR −0.05% 1.20% 0.49% 0.35% −0.09% −0.08% −0.70% 
  (−0.10) (0.45) (0.15) (0.34) (−0.62) (0.00) (−1.04) 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase 
announcement. The stated reasons are provided by the company when announcing the SRP initiation. The number of announcements 
is 104, 576 and 146 for the first, second and third category of stated reason, respectively. The Patell Z-test for the significance of mean 
CARs is shown in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 
  
CAR  
(0,+ 1) 
CAR 
(+2,+10) 
CAR 
(+2,+20) Firm Size  B/M 
CAR 
(−20,−1) NDLR NAP3M      NTDA 
Repurchase 
size (%) 
Mean −0.001 0.006 0.005 11.667 1.591 −0.01 11.838 21.505 1.642 0.038 
Median −0.003 0.002 0.002 11.161 1.104 −0.011 3 13 1 0.014 
Std. Dev.  0.037 0.076 0.112 1.93 2.441 0.118 25.996 20.02 1.356 0.069 
Min −0.15 −0.474 −0.652 8.53 0.112 −0.69 0 0 1 0 
Max 0.224 0.488 0.409 16.922 16.915 0.409 247 66 7 0.848 
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the actual share repurchase announcement. “Firm size” 
is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity on the actual share repurchase announcement date. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio measured on the 
actual share repurchase announcement date. “NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase announcement of the company, i.e., the time between the 
actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of the company’s announcements 
during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before the event day under examination. “NTDA” is the number 
of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same 
day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. 
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                  Table 6  
            Regression results 
  
CAR (0,+1) CAR (+2,+10) CAR (+2,+20) 
Intercept 0.000 0.012 0.086** 
 
(0.01) (0.55) (2.04) 
CAR (−20,−1) −0.021 0.051** 0.046 
 
(−1.22) (1.99) (1.09) 
Firm size  0.001 0.000 −0.004 
 
(0.17) (−0.25) (−1.67) 
B/M 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001 
 
(4.57) (2.08) (0.75) 
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(−0.80) (−0.15) (−0.25) 
NAP3M  0.000 −0.001** −0.001** 
 
(0.44) (−2.33) (−2.29) 
NTDA  0.001 −0.001 0.001 
 
(0.57) (−0.51) (0.32) 
Repurchase size  −0.002 0.050 0.034 
 
(−0.14) (1.22) (0.59) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 826 826 826 
Number of firms  69 69 69 
R-squared 0.024 0.027 0.025 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 
to 21 days before the actual share repurchase announcement. “Firm size” is measured by 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. 
“NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase announcement of the company, 
i.e., the time between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and 
the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of the company’s 
announcements during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the announcements made 
within the last 90 days before the event day under examination. “NTDA” is the number 
of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the 
trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. 
“Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. 
t-tests are reported in parentheses. The regressions include year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. The symbols **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns following actual share repurchases up to three 
years 
    1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
  N Return N Return N Return 
Panel A: Full sample   
Repurchase firms  701 −9.58% 612 −27.82% 519 −22.81% 
Control firms   −21.15%  −45.92%  −51.99% 
Difference   11.57%***  18.10%***  29.18%*** 
t-test   (7.97)  (9.14)  (8.87) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics       
1. By size quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (small) 54 −12.83% 36 11.73% 10 49.01% 
Control firms   −27.84%  −37.88%  −70.08% 
Difference   15.01%**  49.61%***  119.09%** 
t-test 
  
(2.14) 
 
(3.41) 
 
(2.75) 
Repurchase firms 2 175 −14.25% 150 −29.99% 125 −29.68% 
Control firms   −17.41%  −47.08%  −43.88% 
Difference   3.16%  17.09%***  14.20%** 
t-test 
  
(1.12) 
 
(4.60) 
 
(2.49) 
Repurchase 
firms 3 173 −7.70% 142 −17.28% 127 10.43% 
Control firms   −28.18%  −44.15%  −55.31% 
Difference   20.48%***  26.87%***  65.74%*** 
t-test 
  
(7.61) 
 
(6.57) 
 
(7.17) 
Repurchase firms 4 (large) 299 −7.36% 284 −36.95% 257 −38.68% 
Control firms   −18.08%  −47.21%  −53.58% 
Difference   10.72%***  10.26%***  14.90%*** 
t-test   (4.99)  (4.14)  (5.10) 
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 Table 7 (continued) 
2. By B/M quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (high) 147 −17.58% 128 −30.73% 95 −28.42% 
Control firms   −27.09%  −44.83%  −59.06% 
Difference   9.51%***  14.10%***  30.64%*** 
t-test 
  
(3.27) 
 
(3.71) 
 
(4.71) 
Repurchase firms 2 226 −9.09% 187 −19.40% 171 1.02% 
Control firms   −25.26%  −46.62%  −50.72% 
Difference   16.17%***  27.22%***  51.74%*** 
t-test 
  
(5.99) 
 
(7.08) 
 
(6.67) 
Repurchase firms 3 151 −11.82% 132 −28.66% 101 −33.06% 
Control firms   −14.53%  −46.88%  −46.81% 
Difference   2.71%  18.22%***  13.75%*** 
t-test 
  
(0.87) 
 
(4.07) 
 
(2.96) 
Repurchase firms 4 (low) 177 −1.67% 165 −34.42% 152 −39.29% 
Control firms   −16.64%  −45.20%  −52.43% 
Difference   14.97%***  10.78%***  13.14%*** 
t-test     (5.34)   (3.02)   (3.09) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. 
The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  
Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as 
stated by the company. 
  1-Year 2-Year  3-Year 
  N Return N Return N Return 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
Repurchase firms 84 −5.78% 70 −16.93% 68 −25.45% 
Control firms  −11.76%  −39.14%  −53.76% 
Difference  5.98%  22.21%***  28.31%*** 
t-test  (1.58)  (3.36)  (3.25) 
2. Non-stated reason             
Repurchase firms 482 −10.05% 411 −30.52% 345 −26.70% 
Control firms  −20.58%  −44.71%  −47.47% 
Difference  10.53%***  14.19%***  20.77%*** 
t-test  (5.89)  (6.15)  (6.47) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation  
Repurchase firms 135 −10.28% 131 −25.15% 106 −8.45% 
Control firms  −29.05%  −53.33%  −65.55% 
Difference  18.77%***  28.18%***  57.10%*** 
t-test   (5.91)   (6.33)   (5.42) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly 
data. The stated reasons are provided by the company when announcing the SRP initiation. The symbol *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results 
  1-Year BHARs   2-Year BHARs   3-Year BHARs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept 0.307 0.312 0.354  1.109*** 1.143*** 1.189***  1.716** 1.752** 1.955*** 
 
(1.33) (1.35) (1.59) 
 
(2.71) (2.89) (2.97) 
 
(2.52) (2.54) (2.85) 
CAR (−20,−1) 0.183 0.185 0.181  0.143 0.161 0.133  0.568** 0.593** 0.549* 
 
(1.31) (1.31) (1.28) 
 
(0.78) (0.89) (0.72) 
 
(2.06) (2.12) (1.93) 
Firm size  −0.018 −0.018 −0.016  −0.074** −0.074** −0.068**  −0.122** −0.124** −0.116** 
 
(−1.07) (−1.08) (−0.96) 
 
(−2.46) (−2.59) (−2.37) 
 
(−2.55) (−2.56) (−2.63) 
B/M −0.020 −0.020 −0.023  −0.050** −0.050*** −0.057***  −0.062* −0.061* −0.087** 
 
(−1.33) (−1.33) (−1.51) 
 
(−2.49) (−2.65) (−2.69) 
 
(−1.86) (−1.87) (−2.23) 
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.46) 
 
(0.61) (0.46) (0.65) 
 
(0.06) (−0.02) (0.08) 
NAP3M  0.004** 0.004** 0.004**  0.004** 0.005** 0.004**  0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 
 
(1.99) (2.01) (2.03) 
 
(2.07) (2.29) (2.11) 
 
(2.13) (2.28) (2.26) 
NTDA  −0.016 −0.024 −0.025  −0.036 −0.076** −0.053*  0.007 −0.032 −0.029 
 
(−0.97) (−1.22) (−1.34) 
 
(−1.52) (−2.20) (−1.91) 
 
(0.25) (−0.69) (−0.74) 
Repurchase size  −0.131 −0.107 −0.185  −0.338 −0.086 −0.404  −1.642 −1.390 −1.786 
 
(−0.28) (−0.22) (−0.38) 
 
(−0.39) (−0.09) (−0.44) 
 
(−1.29) (−0.99) (−1.34) 
Stated reason - 
undervaluation  0.056    0.290*    0.282  
  
(0.68) 
   
(1.77) 
   
(1.46) 
 
Νon-stated 
reason   −0.077    −0.158*    −0.317* 
   (−1.30)    (−1.77)    (−1.94) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Obs. 701 701 701  612 612 612  519 519 519 
Number of firms  65 65 65  60 60 60  53 53 53 
R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.067   0.122 0.147 0.141   0.157 0.169 0.190 
Long-term abnormal returns (BHARs) are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. “Firm size” is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. “NDLR” is the number of days since the last repurchase announcement 
of the company, i.e., the time between the actual share repurchase announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the 
number of the company’s announcements during the preceding 3 months, calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before the event day 
under examination. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the actual share repurchase announcement and reports the trading days that the firms 
acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. t-tests are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
